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WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE:  
THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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Although the relationship between religion and economic development on the macro-level has been 
investigated, it is less clear how religious background influences economic attitudes and financial 
decision-making on the level of the individual or household, the micro-level. We use panel data from 
the extensive DNB Household Survey, covering the period from 1995 to 2008, to investigate whether 
– and through which channel – religious denomination affects household finance in the Netherlands. 
We find evidence that, in general, religious households care more about saving, are more risk-averse, 
consider themselves more trusting, have a more external locus of control, and have a stronger bequest 
motive. Furthermore, Catholics and Protestants have longer planning horizons, and Protestants and 
Evangelicals seem to have a greater sense of individual financial responsibility. Most of these factors 
matter  for  household  financial  decision-making,  albeit  to  differing  degrees.  Using  our  religion 
variables as instruments for economic attitudes (and controlling for demographic and background risk 
characteristics),  we  demonstrate  that  the  above-mentioned  differences  in  economic  beliefs  and 
preferences explain the higher propensity to save by religious households in general and the lower 
investments in risky assets by Catholic households.  
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“For fools rush in where angels fear to tread 
Distrustful sense with modest caution speaks” 
[Alexander Pope, ‘An Essay on Criticism’, 1711] 
1. Introduction 
In the past, the relationship between religion and economics has been studied rather frequently – see 
Iannacone (1998) for an excellent introduction to the literature. One particular aspect that has received 
a lot of attention in recent years is the significance of religion as a macroeconomic force. For example, 
Barro and McCleary (2003) investigate how religion affects economic development. The authors come 
to the conclusion that growth is positively influenced by “believing” (for example, in heaven and hell), 
but responds negatively to the degree of “belonging” (church attendance) across countries. Building 
on Max Weber‘s famous claim that the Protestant work-and-save ethic led to a “spirit of capitalism” in 
Protestant  regions,
1  Landes  (1998)  argues  that  religious  differences  can  partially  explain  the 
differences in economic growth between nations. Blum and Dudley (2001) look into the relationship 
between religious beliefs and economic growth in early-modern Europe and conclude that Protestant 
cities constructed beneficial economic networks. Their model suggests that these networks may have 
been made possible by the high cost of contractual defection in Protestantism.
2 In a similar vein, Stulz 
and  Williamson  (2003)  find  that  a  country’s  religion  predicts  the  degree  of  investor  protection: 
Catholic countries have significantly weaker creditor rights than Protestant countries.  
Although the  importance of  religion at  the economic macro level has  been  established,  it is  still 
unclear  in  how  far  religion  and  religiosity  drive  people’s  financial  decisions  at  the  micro  level. 
Although Iannaccone (1998) argued that “there may be no […] relationship between religion and 
economic  attitudes”,  other  research  suggests  that  religion  does  have  a  significant  effect  on 
economically relevant beliefs and preferences such as thrift, trust, and the awareness of individual 
                                                 
1 Weber’s thesis has been the subject of fierce debates in the literature. Iannacone (1998) writes that “the most 
noteworthy feature of the Protestant ethic thesis is its absence of empirical support”. A new paper by Becker and 
Woessmann (2009) provides an interesting alternative theory for the stronger growth in Protestant regions. The 
authors document Martin Luther’s stress on the importance of education (so that everyone could read the Bible), 
and argue that it is the resulting higher literacy of Protestants that can explain historical differences in economic 
development. Arruñada (2009) rejects the work ethic hypothesis as well in favor of an alternative. He argues that 
is rather the Protestant “social ethic that favoured market transactions and market-enhancing institutions” that is 
relevant.  
2  The  concept  of  predestination  is  important  here.  According  to  Blum  and  Dudley  (2001),  “any  defection 
weakened the individual’s conviction that he was predestined to be saved”, especially among Calvinists. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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responsibility (Guiso et al., 2003; Arruñada, 2009). Variation in these attitudes may directly impact 
the financial choices individuals make, i.e. household finance.
3 
Following  the  democratization  of  financial  markets  and  the  wave  of  product  innovations  in  the 
consumer financial services sector during the 1990s, the analysis of household finance has become a 
fast-growing  academic  area  (Guiso  et  al.,  2002).  It  is  well  documented  that  both  demographic 
variables (such  as  age,  gender,  family  size,  and  education)  and  background  risk  factors  (such  as 
private  business  risk  and  health)  are  important  determinants  of  households’  portfolio  decisions 
(Campbell, 2006).  
Over the last few years, an expanding literature has explored less traditional explanations of household 
financial decision-making. Some authors have focused on the roles played by cognitive abilities and 
biases (Christelis et al., 2008; Stango and Zinman, 2008) and households’ financial literacy (Van 
Rooij  et  al.,  2007;  Guiso and  Jappelli,  2009). Not  surprisingly,  there has  also  been  an  increased 
attention to socio and cultural forces that may be at work. For example, Puri and Robinson (2007) 
investigate the role of optimism in making economic decisions. Hong et al. (2004) and Brown et al. 
(2008) study the impact of social interaction and peer effects on stock market participation. Guiso et 
al. (2008) look into the effects of general and personalized trust. Georgarakos and Pasini (2009) take 
into account both sociability and trust.  
In this literature, religion and religiosity have only been mentioned in passing. Hong et al. (2004) use 
church attendance as a measure of social interaction, while Christelis et al. (2008) control for religious 
participation in their analysis. Guiso et al. (2008) note that a person’s trust may well be influenced by 
his ethnic and religious background.  
More research is clearly  needed. Therefore, in this paper, we investigate whether religion has an 
impact on the savings and investment decisions of households. Moreover, we try to identify through 
which economic attitude religious background has its effect. To do so, we make use of the DNB 
Household  Survey,  formerly  known  as  the  CentER  Savings  Study.  This  survey  collects  detailed 
information on a (yearly updated) sample of about 2,000 Dutch households, by means of weekly 
questionnaires.  We  combine  data  on  religion,  demographic  variables,  wealth  and  income, 
                                                 
3 Two recent papers look into the impact of religion on an intermediate level between the country and the 
individual. Hilary and Hui (2008) investigate how a firm’s investment decisions are affected by the religiosity of 
its  environment.  Kumar  et  al.  (2009)  see  religion  as  an  instrument  for  gambling  and  relate  geographical 
heterogeneity  in  religion  to  differences  in  a  number  of  financial  market  outcomes  (institutional  investors’ 
portfolio  choices,  employee  stock  option  plans,  IPO  markets,  and  the  pricing  of  stocks  with  lottery-type 
features). Both studies use data at the county level in the United States. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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psychological and economic concepts, and portfolio decisions, all of which are included in this panel 
survey. In the past, the DNB Household Survey has been proven useful not only to study the general 
composition of household portfolios in the Netherlands (Alessie et al., 2002), but also the effects of 
financial literacy (Van Rooij et al., 2007) and trust (Guiso et al., 2008) on stock market participation. 
Also for other reasons than the existence of a long-term large household survey, the Netherlands is the 
ideal place to examine the relationship between religion and individual decision-making: the country 
is  characterized  by  considerable  heterogeneity  in  religiosity.  Moreover,  the  distinction  between 
religious and non-religious people is not as blurred as in other European countries: the people in the 
Netherlands who consider themselves members of a religious denomination are usually true believers.  
Subsequent to outlining the cultural and historical background, we will identify the economic values 
and attitudes that are relevant within the context of financial decision-making. We then undertake a 
reduced-form  approach  to  investigate  to  which  degree  religious  people  make  different  financial 
decisions. As a last step, we try to establish a causal link between religion and household finance by 
tracing “the effect of culture through the economic channels it is supposed to affect” (Guiso et al., 
2006).  
We find clear evidence that the economic attitudes of religious households differ from those of non-
religious ones. In the Netherlands, religious individuals (i) care significantly more about thrift, (ii) are 
somewhat more risk-averse, (iii) are more likely to consider themselves as trusting other people and 
the society, (iv) have a weaker internal locus of control (meaning that they believe that their life 
outcomes are not entirely determined by their own actions), and (v) have a stronger bequest motive 
(they care more about the inheritance of their children) than non-religious people. In general, these 
results hold for Catholics, Protestants, and Evangelicals, although there are clear differences in the 
magnitude of the effect. In addition, Catholics and Protestants have longer planning horizons, while 
Protestants  and  Evangelicals  seem  to  have  a  slightly  higher  awareness  of  individual  financial 
responsibility.  
Controlling for a large number of demographic characteristics and background risk factors, we show 
that  religious  households  are  more  inclined  to  save  money  than  non-religious  ones.  Catholic 
households, and also Protestant ones (but to a lower degree), are less likely to invest in risky assets. In 
contrast, Evangelical households invest significantly more money in stocks and other risky financial 
asset classes. An instrumental variable set-up (in which economic attitudes are instrumented with 
religious background) shows that these differences in financial choices can largely be explained by the WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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different views on economic beliefs and preferences outlined above. For example, the higher emphasis 
on thrift, higher risk aversion, higher self-reported trust, stronger bequest motive, and longer planning 
horizon of religious households make them more likely to save. The lower probability of investing in 
risky assets found for Catholic households may result from the effects of religion on risk aversion, the 
bequest motive, and the planning horizon.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the cultural background of our 
study. In Section 3, we give an overview of the economic attitudes through which religion may impact 
individual  financial  decision-making.  Section  4  describes  our  data  set,  variables,  and  empirical 
strategy. Section 5 outlines the empirical results, while robustness tests are included in Section 6. 
Section 7 concludes and discusses some implications.  
 
2. Cultural background  
Since the 1950s, many theologians have argued that the impact of established religions on societies 
would decrease. In a secularized era, metaphysical issues were expected to be an entirely private 
matter. Hence, the weekly newspaper The Economist (1999) published an obituary of God at the end 
of the previous century, declaring that “after a long career, the Almighty has passed into history”. 
However,  eight  years  later,  the  same  weekly  had  to  admit  that  it  had  shown  overconfidence  in 
declaring God dead, and that religion still plays an important role in many societies (The Economist, 
2007).   
In  contrast  to  some  other  regions  where  religious  movements  have  not  abandoned  their  political 
agendas, religiosity is mostly a personal matter in Europe. Across the European continent, the impact 
of  religion  on  the  individual  is  very  heterogeneous.  For  instance,  the  Atlas  of  European  Values 
(Halman et al., 2005) shows that in Poland, Ireland, Romania, Croatia, and Malta, more than 90 
percent of the people celebrate their poignant moments of life in the church. In contrast, in the Czech 
Republic and the Netherlands, less than half of the population appreciates a religious service. Still, in 
most countries, pure atheists are a small minority, and there are more people who consider themselves 
religious than there are church-goers. This is the phenomenon of “believing without belonging”. 
The Netherlands is an interesting country to study the effect of religion on individual decision-making, 
for  two  different  reasons.  First,  there  is  considerable  variety  in  types  of  religious  beliefs.  As  a 
consequence of the sixteenth-century religion-based wars between the Catholic Spanish rulers and WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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Protestants rebels, half of the Dutch population has traditionally been Protestant and half Catholic. 
Since the  1950s,  however,  the Netherlands  have  quickly  turned  into one  of  the most  secularized 
countries in Europe. Nowadays, a small majority of the Dutch population is religious. The largest 
religious  denomination  is the Roman Catholic Church:  almost 27% of  the  Dutch  population is  a 
member (WRR, 2006). Taken together, mainstream Protestant churches account for a bit less than 
15% of the population.
4 Evangelicals (and Pentecostals), conservative Protestants who share a strong 
belief in a literal interpretation of the bible and the importance of rebirth, make up about 1%; and 2% 
has other non-Christian religious beliefs. Almost 6% of the Dutch population is Muslim. The other 
49% of the population in the Netherlands does not formally belong to a specific denomination.  
Second, the distinction between religious and non-religious individuals is probably easier to make in 
the Netherlands than in other countries. Generally, those who declare to belong to a specific religious 
denomination also practice (i.e. pray and/or go to church), whereas people who may have been raised 
within a religious tradition but do not believe and practice, do not consider themselves as religiously 
affiliated (Halman et al., 2005).
5  
 
3. Religion and economic attitudes 
In this section, we identify individuals’ economic beliefs and preferences that, according to previous 
research, seem influenced by the religious background. Where instructive, we also indicate how these 
attitudes  may  have  an  impact  on  financial  decisions.  Demographic  variables  (such  as  gender, 
education, and income) and background risks (such as health status
6 and (un)employment) are traits 
that may be correlated with both religion and portfolio decisions, and will therefore be used as control 
variables in our empirical analysis of Section 4. In this section, we mainly focus on Christian religions, 
since Catholics and Protestants are by far the largest religious groups in the Netherlands. 
 
                                                 
4 This includes the Protestant Church in the Netherlands and two small groups of Reformed churches (WRR, 
2006). 
5 Judging from the Atlas of European Values, this is not always the case in other countries. For instance, more 
than  55%  of  the  German  population  consider  themselves  as  religious  persons  but  only  about  33%  prays 
regularly. Similarly, two thirds of the Belgian people state that they are religious but only one third prays. 
Almost 75% of the Danes regard themselves as religious, but merely 20% prays in a regular basis.  
6 For a recent analysis on how the health status of households influences their portfolio decisions, see Rosen and 
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3.1. Thrift  
As Keister (2003) notes, “religious doctrine seldom discourages saving and nearly always encourages 
correct and conventional living”. It is thus not surprising that Guiso et al. (2003) find that religiosity is 
associated with a higher emphasis on the importance of saving. In their research, Catholics appear to 
value thrift more than Protestants, which somewhat contradicts the Weberian claim that it was mainly 
Protestant thriftiness that has stimulated the growth of capitalism. 
3.2. Risk preferences 
Previous research has shown that religiosity is in general positively correlated with risk aversion 
(Hilary and Hui, 2008; Miller and Hoffmann, 1995). There is less consensus about the differences in 
the effect between the denominations. Based on a univariate analysis, Barsky et al. (1997) report that 
Catholics are more risk tolerant than Protestants, but less than Jews. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) find 
that  the  effect  depends  on  the  situation:  Catholics  and  Jews  are  more  averse  to  “pure”  risk  (as 
measured by their coefficient of relative risk aversion in a model of life insurance demand), but more 
tolerant  of  “speculative”  risk-taking  (as  measured  by  the  willingness  to  accept  a  job  with  equal 
chances of doubling or reducing the household income).  
3.3. Locus of control and individual responsibility 
Religious beliefs may be correlated with a different view on the locus of control: to which degree do 
life’s  outcomes  depend  upon  one’s  own  behavior  (internal  locus  of  control)  or  external  forces 
(external  locus  of  control)?  Intuitively,  people  with  religious  beliefs  –  and  especially  those  of 
Protestants, who believe in predestination – are expected to have a stronger external locus of control. 
At the same time, however, there is evidence that religious people have a “greater sense of individual 
responsibility” and “are more inclined to believe that people in need are lazy and lack will power” 
(Guiso  et  al.,  2003).  This  sense  of  individual  responsibility  may  be  particularly  relevant  in 
Protestantism, in which “each individual determines on his own what is right” (Stulz and Williamson, 
2003). 
It is well known that one’s locus of control can have an impact on a wide range of behaviors and 
decisions, including financial ones. For example, Boone et al. (1996) show that a CEO’s locus of 
control matters as it influences corporate performance. It is thus possible that differences in the locus 
of control and the awareness of individual financial responsibility are also reflected in the financial 
decisions that households make. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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3.4. Social capital 
Although Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Bellemare and Kröger (2007) report that religious beliefs 
do not seem to affect the level of trust, Guiso et al. (2003) find that people who are actively practicing 
religion or are raised religiously trust other people more. However, also in their study, the relationship 
is not clear-cut. Religious upbringing negatively affects trust for Catholics, but not for Protestants. 
Nevertheless,  more  religious  participation  seems  associated  with  more  trust  in  all  religions.  The 
authors conclude that “overall, Christian religions foster trust, but more so for Protestants”. Similarly, 
Welch et al. (2007) and Arruñada (2009) find that Protestants are more likely to trust people they are 
not acquainted with than Catholics. Religiosity  may  also play  an  important  (but  obvious) role in 
forming social capital through the social networks built by attending religious services or participating 
in activities organized by religious charity organizations.
7 
In  recent  years,  an  increasing  interest  has  arisen  in  the  link  between  social  capital  and  financial 
decision-making. For instance, Guiso et al. (2008) establish a solid relationship between trust and 
stock market participation. Both generalized trust and personalized trust in one’s banker have a large 
positive effect on the probability of stock market participation and the share of an individual’s wealth 
invested in stocks (conditional on participation). Likewise, Hong et al. (2004) and Brown et al. (2008) 
find  that  sociability  and  social  interaction  have  a  strong  impact  on  the  decision  to  buy  stocks. 
Georgarakos and Pasini (2009) confirm the positive effects of both trust and sociability. 
3.5. Bequest motive and planning horizon 
Religion  may  induce  different  views  on  intergenerational  transfers  and  planning  horizons.  For 
example, Fink and Redaelli (2005) report that Catholic households are more likely to leave a bequest, 
other things equal. These households may therefore also have longer time horizons, since the two 
concepts are interrelated (Christelis et al., 2008). Due to their belief in the “imminent return of Jesus 
Christ and a view that we are therefore currently living in the end times” (Crowe, 2009), Evangelicals 
may have shorter time horizons.  
In turn, these factors may affect financial decisions. Although there is little empirical work on how the 
existence of a bequest motive influences savings and investments decisions, one can logically expect 
households with a strong bequest motive to save more. There is no unambiguous theoretical prediction 
about how the household’s portfolio should change with the planning horizon, although it seems that 
                                                 
7 Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008) show how differences in returns to social connections may explain the positive 
correlation between church attendance and education found in the United States. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
  9
financial advisors often recommend to decrease the fraction of wealth invested in risky assets as the 
horizon gets shorter (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Campbell and Viceira, 2002).  
 
4. Data and empirical strategy 
4.1. Data 
The basis for this study is the DNB Household Survey, managed by CentERdata at Tilburg University. 
The Household Survey collects data from an online panel of about 2,000 households.
8 The panel is 
representative  of  the  Dutch-speaking  population  of  the  Netherlands  and  changes  slowly  over  the 
years.
9 Every year, CentERdata puts the collected data online
10; most of the information is freely 
available to scholars. The data are grouped in eight categories. Six basic categories cover these topics: 
(i)  general  information  on  the  household;  (ii)  household  and  work;  (iii)  accommodation  and 
mortgages;  (iv)  health  and  income;  (v)  assets  and  liabilities;  (vi)  economic  and  psychological 
concepts. Two more aggregated categories comprise: (vii) aggregated information on income, and 
(vii) information on assets, liabilities, and mortgages of the households.  
In our analysis, we use data covering 1995 until 2008 (whenever possible). For each household, we 
start from the data of the individual labeled as the household head.
11 In the following paragraphs, we 
outline the variables used in this study. An overview of the definitions of all variables is provided in 
Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.1.1 Financial decisions  
We use a number of different financial decisions as dependent variables in our analysis. The variable 
SAVED is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent indicates that the household has put 
some money aside over the last twelve months. RISKY is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
                                                 
8 Households without internet access are given a so-called set-top box with which they can access the internet 
using their television sets. Household which don’t have a television either are provided with one by CentERdata. 
9 Until the end of the 1990s, the DNB Household Survey included a disproportionately large number of high 
income households. To mitigate the concern that this may impact our result, we always control for income and 
year effects, in addition to a wide range of demographic variables. 
10 http://www.centerdata.nl 
11 If more than one member of the household reports to be the household head, we start from the data of the main 
wage earner or the person who does the financial administration. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
  10 
household has a positive investment in risky financial assets, such as bonds, growth funds, mutual 
funds, stocks, or put- and call-options. The dummy variable STOCKS is more restrictive, and equals 
one if a household invests in individual stocks. Finally, RISKY/FINASSETS measures the share of 
total financial assets invested in risky assets (and is thus also equal to 1 minus the proportion of safe 
assets to total financial assets).
12 RISKY/FINASSETS* captures the same issue but is restricted to 
holders of risky assets. 
4.1.2 Religion 
Our dummy variable RELIGIOUS equals one if the respondent considers himself as a member of a 
religious movement. We also make a distinction between CATHOLIC, PROTESTANT (for mainline 
Protestants), EVANGELICAL, and OTHER RELIGION.
13 One of the advantages of studying the 
Netherlands is that it is clear whether people are religious or not, as outlined before.  
4.1.3 Economic attitudes  
Between 2004 and 2007, all individuals in the DNB Household Survey were asked to which degree 
they agree with the statement “Being careful with money is an important character trait”. This variable 
THRIFT takes values from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”).  
In all years, household members are asked whether they agree, again on a scale from 1 to 7, with the 
statement “I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns, than to take a 
risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns”. The resulting variable (RISK AVERSION) 
should measure the household head’s risk preferences.  
The variable INTERNAL LOCUS proxies for the individual’s locus of control which indicates to 
which degree the respondent agrees with the statement “My life is determined by my own actions”, on 
a  scale  from  1  to  7.  LOW  RESPONSIBILITY  focuses  on  the  sense  of  individual  financial 
responsibility: “It is chiefly a matter of fate whether I become rich or poor” (with a scale where 1 is 
                                                 
12 The variable RISKYFIN is censored at 0 and 1 in a few cases in which the calculated values fell outside this 
range.  
13 Although Muslims represent almost 6% of the Dutch population, they only form a very small part of the 
dataset  (less  than  0.5  percent),  and  are  therefore  included  in  the  OTHER  RELIGION  category.  The 
underrepresentation  of  Muslims  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  DNB  Household  Survey  wants  to  be 
representative of the Dutch-speaking population. The dummy  variable OTHER  RELIGION also equals one 
when the respondent indicates to be a religious humanist, or to be a member of another (non-specified) religious 
denomination. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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”totally disagree” whereas 7 stands for “totally agree”). Unfortunately, the data for these variables 
variable are only available from 2005 until 2007.  
To  explore  the  role  of  social  capital,  we  rely  on  a  measure  of  self-reported  trust  in  the  DNB 
Household  Survey.  This  variable,  labeled  DISTRUST,  is  measured  on  a  scale  of  1  (“trusting, 
credulous”) to 7 (“suspicious”). The data are available for all years until 2002 (except in 1996).
14  
We test for the existence of a bequest motive by introducing a variable (BEQUEST MOTIVE), which 
measures how important the respondent believes it is “to save so I can leave a house and/or other 
valuable assets to my children” on a scale from 1 (“very unimportant”) to 7 (“very important”).
15 We 
also include the household’s planning horizon in our analysis. The variable TIME HORIZON contains 
the answer to the question “Which of the time-horizons mentioned below is in your household most 
important with regard to planning expenditures and savings?” on a scale from 1 (“the next couple of 
months”) to 5 (“more than 10 years from now”). 
4.1.4 Control variables 
We include a wide range of demographic control variables, the most obvious ones being AGE, its 
square AGE^2, and the dummy variable MALE. The composition of the household is measured by the 
dummy variable PARTNER (which equals one if the household head has a partner who is also part of 
the  household)  and  the  variable  CHILDREN  (the  number  of  children  in  the  household).  BAD 
HEALTH is a dummy variable that equals one in all cases in which the person indicates his health to 
be “fair”, “not so good” or “poor”, as opposed to “excellent” or “good”. 
The employment status of the household head is captured by the dummy variables EMPLOYED (on a 
contractual basis), SELF-EMPLOYED (in own business, in a liberal profession, on a freelance basis, 
etc.) and RETIRED, where the left-out category includes all unemployed household heads. Three 
dummy variables capture the level of completed education by the household head: UNIVERSITY, 
VOCATIONAL  (for  household  heads  who  have  a  degree  from  a  vocational  college)  and  PRE-
UNIVERSITY  (for individuals  who have  a  scientific secondary/high  school degree). The left-out 
category  includes  all  individuals  with  another  degree,  or  none  at  all.  The  dummy  variable 
EDU_ACQUAINTANCES equals one if the respondent indicates that most of his acquaintances have 
                                                 
14 To the survey of 2008, we have added the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?” in order to measure trust in the same way 
as did Guiso et al. (2008). However, when using this variable, the sample size becomes rather small such that it 
is difficult to get sufficient statistical power to draw any conclusions on this new question.   
15 Individuals without children are asked not to answer this question. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
  12 
a high education level (university or vocational college). This variable is expected to capture peer 
effects.  
Data on (the natural log of) the aggregated net income of the household (LN(INCOME) and its square 
LN(INCOME)^2) are calculated from the data sets in the DNB Household Survey. We also calculate 
(the log of) each household’s net wealth by aggregating the value of all assets (except private business 
equity) and subtracting debts and mortgages. This leads to the control variables LN(NETWORTH) 
and LN(NETWORTH)^2. All income and net worth figures were first transformed to real terms using 
the official consumer price index of Statistics Netherlands. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 gives the descriptives (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, 
and maximum) for the variables outlined above. It should be noted that we are considering a data 
panel consisting of household-year observations. Table 2 shows that in 71% of the cases the household 
had saved in the preceding year, and in 28% the household indicates it owns risky assets. In our 
sample, slightly more than half of our observations concern households with a religious head. The 
biggest religious group is the Catholic one, followed by the Protestants, in line with the overall Dutch 
population (see Section 2). It also becomes clear from Table 2 that there is considerable variation in 
the  answers  on  the  questions  relating  to  economic  attitudes,  which  will  enable  us  to  get  an 
understanding of the relationship between religious background, economic beliefs and preferences, 
and financial decisions.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.3. Empirical strategy 
In a first step, we perform a univariate analysis to check whether, on average, religious people have 
different economic attitudes and take different financial decisions than do non-religious people. We 
compare the mean values on the relevant variables using a two-sample T-test. We repeat this analysis 
to formally test whether the mean value for each separate religious denomination is equal to that of the 
non-religious group. The results are reported in subsection 5.1. 
Second, we undertake a reduced-from approach to investigate to which degree religiosity is associated 
with differences in household finance. We estimate the following multivariate model: WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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it it it it T C X Y 1 1 ε γ β α + + + + =              (1), 
where  Yit  is  the  financial decision  variable  (SAVED, RISKY,  STOCKS, RISKY/FINASSETS,  or 
RISKY/FINASSETS*), Xit are the religion dummy variables, and Cit are our control variables (such as 
AGE, EMPLOYED, LN(INCOME), etc.). In all equations, T stands for fixed time effects, while the 
alphas (α) are intercepts and the epsilons (ε) are error terms. Depending on the nature of the dependent 
variable, we will use a probit (dummy variables) or tobit (censored continuous variables) model, or 
estimate an OLS regression. Our interest mainly lies in the coefficient β, which gives information on 
the  relationship  between  religiosity  and  financial  decision-making,  but  we  will  also  discuss  the 
coefficients on the control variables (γ). In line with Petersen (2009), we cluster standard errors per 
household to account for unobserved household effects: residuals may be correlated across time for 
the same household.
16 Subsection 5.2. discusses the results of this analysis.  
Third, we try to identify the channels through which religion has its impact on household finance. We 
start  by  estimating  the  structural  relationship  between  economic  attitudes  and  financial  decision-
making:  
it it it it T C E Y 2 2 ε λ κ α + + + + =              (2), 
where Eit captures the economic attitudes (THRIFT, RISK AVERSION, etc.), and Yit and Cit stands for 
the same control variables as before. The coefficients κ will provide insight in the correlation between 
the choices to save or to invest in risky assets on the one hand, and economic attitudes on the other. 
However, as the self-reported economic attitudes might be endogenous to the financial decisions, and 
as  we  are  mainly  interested  in  how  religion  impacts  financial  choices,  we  apply  a  two-step 
instrumental variable framework, in which each economic attitude is instrumented with the religion 
variables. The simultaneous equations system is the following: 
it it it it T C X E 3 3 ε ν µ α + + + + =             (3) 
it IV it IV it it T C E Y 4 4 ˆ ε λ κ α + + + + =             (4). 
In the first step, equation (3), the value on the economic attitude Eit is regressed on all instruments, i.e. 
the religion data (Xit), the control variables (Cit), and the time fixed effects (T). The coefficients µ 
                                                 
16 A different way to address the issue of residual dependence in a panel data set-up is the use of a random 
effects model: see our robustness checks in Section 6. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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measure the impact of religious background on economic beliefs and preferences. In the second step, 
equation (4), the predicted values on the economic attitudes (Êit) are introduced, so that the coefficient 
κIV, the instrumental variable equivalent of κ from equation (2), shows how financial decisions are 
influenced by exogenously induced variation in the economic attitudes. It is important to note that, in 
this  two-step  set-up,  standard  errors  can  not  be  clustered  per  household  anymore.
17  A  potential 
problem with instrumental variables estimation is that the instruments are only weakly correlated to 
the endogenous regressor (here the economic attitude). Therefore, in each case, we report the results of 
the F-test on the excluded instruments Xit in the OLS estimation of equation (3). An often-used cut-off 
value  for  this  test  is  10;  if  the  F-statistic  is  higher,  there  is  little  reason  to  worry  about  weak 
instruments (Verbeek, 2004). When we use more than one instrument, we perform an Amemiya-Lee-
Newey minimum chi-square test to check that our model is adequately identified. The null hypothesis 
of this test is that the instruments are valid, i.e. that they are uncorrelated with the error term in the 
structural equation (2). A rejection of this test would cast doubt on the specification of the model. In 
every model, we also report the results of a Wald exogeneity test, which has as null hypothesis that the 
instrumented variable is exogenous. If the test is rejected, this means that we are indeed right in our 




5.1. Univariate analysis 
We want to investigate whether religious individuals have other beliefs and preferences (that matter 
for household financial decision-making) than non-religious individuals. Therefore, we undertake an 
independent-samples T-test in which we compare the mean values on the different economic attitude 
variables for religious and non-religious respondents in the DNB Household Survey. Since not all 
economic attitudes have been measured in every  year, the magnitude of the sample varies.
18 The 
results are outlined in Panel A of Table 3. We also compare the means of the non-religious category 
with those of – respectively – the Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical, and ‘other religion’ groups.  
                                                 
17 In Section 6, we will undertake a maximum likelihood instrumental variable analysis with clustered standard 
errors. 
18 Also, each household (head) is included only once in this univariate analysis. If the household is in the survey 
panel for more than one year, we only use the economic attitude of the household for the last available year. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
It becomes clear that religious people, on average, care more about saving, are somewhat more risk 
averse (although not significantly), have a weaker internal locus of control, consider themselves more 
trusting, deem it much more important to leave money to their children, and have a longer planning 
horizon. In most cases, the direction of the effect is the same for all included Christian religions (the 
only exception is the planning horizon), but the magnitude sometimes differs. For example, it seems 
that,  at  least  in  this  univariate  set-up,  thriftiness  is  particularly  important  for  Protestants  and 
Evangelicals. The same groups also have a weaker internal locus of control than Catholics (and non-
religious  individuals),  and  a  somewhat  greater  sense  of  individual  financial  responsibility.  The 
reported statistics also show that especially Catholics deem it important to leave a bequest to their 
children and have longer planning horizons. In many respects, Evangelicals seem to have the most 
outspoken views: they care the most about thrift, are the most risk-averse, and have the strongest 
external locus of control. However, the number of observations for this group is small, which implies 
that only cautious generalizations can be made. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of a similar analysis, but this time for financial decisions. In 
general, religious individuals more frequently report that they have saved in the previous year. There 
are only relatively small differences between religious and non-religious households with respect to 
their investments in risky assets in general, or in stocks in particular. Protestants and Evangelicals are 
somewhat more likely than non-religious households to hold stocks, and also have higher proportions 
of their wealth in risky assets, but the differences are statistically not significant.  
Religion is not the only factor that impacts on (or is correlated with) the financial decision variables. 
Therefore, we now turn to a multivariate analysis in which we can control for a large number of 
demographic  and  background  characteristics  that  have  been  identified  in  the  household  finance 
literature.  
5.2. Reduced-form approach 
The direct, reduced-form impact of religious background on financial decisions is analyzed in Table 4. 
Conditional on the nature of the dependent variable, we apply a probit (for the dummy variables 
SAVED, RISKY, and STOCKS), tobit (for the censored variable RISKY/FINASSETS), or OLS (for 
the same variable, but limited to risky asset holders: RISKY/FINASSETS*) model. As outlined in the 
previous section, we include all control variables, while year dummies capture fixed time effects.  WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table  4  shows  that  religious  household  heads  are  more  likely  to  put  aside  money  (SAVED), 
controlling for age, gender of the respondent, household structure (partner and children), health status, 
employment status, educational level (both of the household head and of the acquaintances), income, 
net worth, and year effects. The effect is similar in magnitude for Catholic and Protestant households: 
the probit coefficients imply that both household types are about 3% more likely to have saved than 
non-religious ones, holding all other variables constant at their mean. The effect is even larger for 
Evangelicals, although in this case the coefficient is not significant, due to the relatively small number 
of Evangelical households. Catholics are significantly less likely to invest in risky assets in general 
(RISKY), and in stocks in particular (STOCKS). Protestants also seem somewhat less likely to invest 
in risky assets relative to non-religious people. The reverse is true for Evangelicals: they are almost 
23% more likely to invest in risky assets, all else equal, possibly following from the importance they 
attach to individual financial responsibility. The same pattern re-emerges when considering the share 
of financial assets invested in risky assets (RISKY/FINASSETS). We do not see significant effects of 
religion on these proportions conditional on holding risky assets (RISKY/FINASSETS*), although the 
sign is again negative for Catholic households and positive for Evangelical ones.  
The financial decisions to save, to invest in risky assets, and to invest in stocks are also correlated with 
most of the demographic and background risk factors included in our analysis. Male household heads 
are  less likely  to  save  (although  not  significantly),  and  more  likely  to  invest  in  risky  assets  and 
especially stocks. The opposite holds when a partner is present in the household. The presence of 
children and a bad health status seem to make it more difficult to save money, while retired household 
heads are more likely to save. More highly educated individuals are more likely to invest in risky 
assets, even when controlling for the employment status and income. As expected, there are also 
income and net worth effects: households with a very high net income or net worth are much more 
likely to invest in risky asset categories (as the squared term indicates). 
5.3. Instrumental variable approach 
A caveat on the reduced-form approach is that it does not enable us to draw conclusions on why 
religious households save more or invest less in risky assets. Therefore, we incorporate economic 
attitudes in our analysis. We first want to verify that the potential channels outlined in the literature 
review do matter indeed for household financial decision-making. Table 5 outlines the results of a 
multivariate analysis presented in the previous section, but now with the different economic attitudes WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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as independent variables (instead of the religion variables). We also include all the control variables 
exhibited in Table 4, but do not report them in Table 5 for reasons of conciseness. Also, henceforth, 
we will focus on SAVED, RISKY, and RISKY/FINASSETS.
19  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
From Panels A-C of Table 5, we conclude that differences in economic attitudes (between people of 
varying  religious  denominations)  are  indeed  correlated  with  differences  in  financial  decisions. 
Household heads who care more about thrift, have a greater sense of individual responsibility (i.e. who 
think that becoming rich or poor does not depend on fate), or have longer financial planning horizons 
are  both  more  likely  to  save  and  to  own  risky  assets.  As  expected,  risk  averse  individuals  head 
households which save more, but invest less in risky asset categories. Additionally, there is a positive 
correlation  between  the  self-reported  distrust  and  the  bequest  motive  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
probability of owning risky assets on the other.   
In this analysis, most of the statistically significant differences are also economically significant. For 
example, holding all other variables constant at their mean, household heads who “totally agree” that 
thrift is an important character trait are 12.65% more likely to have saved and 15.16% more likely to 
own risky assets than individuals who “totally disagree” with that statement. Similarly, the most risk 
averse households are 9.22% more likely to have put aside money and 20.08% less likely to own 
stocks than the least risk averse ones.  
However, the  problem  with  this  analysis  is that the  economic  attitudes  may  be  endogenous  with 
respect to the financial decisions, and therefore the results in Table 5 cannot be interpreted as being 
causal. For example, someone who has locked up money in risky assets may be more likely to indicate 
that he has a long planning horizon exactly because of this risky investment. Also, it is likely that both 
the bequest motive and the financial decisions are both influenced by demographic factors such as the 
net worth position of the household, leading to an upward bias of the coefficient in Table 5.  
Therefore, undertaking an instrumental variable (IV) analysis in which the attitudes are instrumented 
with the exogenous religion variables will serve two goals at once: (i) it enables us to identify through 
                                                 
19  STOCKS  is  just  a  subcategory  of  RISKY,  and  RISKY/FINASSETS*  takes  the  same  values  as 
RISKY/FINASSETS, but limits the sample to holders of risky assets. Moreover, from the previous section, we 
conclude that STOCK is impacted in the same way by religious background as the broader RISKY category. The 
only  relevant  difference  is  that  the  coefficient  on  the  Protestant  dummy  is  negative  in  the  RISKY  model 
(although not significant), but very close to zero (and positive) in the STOCK model. The same more or less 
holds for RISKY/FINASSETS* and RISKY/FINASSETS, respectively. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
  18 
which  economic  attitudes  religious  beliefs  affect  financial  decisions,  and  (ii)  it  alleviates  the 
endogeneity concerns as the ones outlined in the previous paragraph. Table 6 reports the results of a 
Newey two-step IV approach in which the economic attitudes are instrumented with (i) RELIGION, 
(ii) CATHOLIC, PROTESTANT, EVANGELICAL, and OTHER RELIGION, or (iii) CATHOLIC 
and  PROTESTANT.  In  the  third  model  specification,  Evangelicals  and  “other”  religious 
denominations are excluded, since these small groups may make it more difficult to get to meaningful 
results.  All  control  variables  (on  demography,  employment,  education,  etc.)  are  included  in  both 
stages  of  the  estimation,  but  the  coefficients  on  these  variables  are  not  reported  for  reasons  of 
conciseness. As explained in Section 3, Table 6 also shows the results of a Wald test testing the 
exogeneity of the economic attitude, of the Amemiya-Lee-Newey (ALN) overidentification test (in all 
cases where more than one instrument is used) to ensure that our model is adequately identified, and 
of the F-test to check that the religion variables are no weak instruments for the economic attitudes. 
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
The first stage results of Panels A-G of Table 6 confirm the previous, univariate findings on the 
differences in economic attitudes between religious groups: Catholics, Protestants, and Evangelicals 
seem to care more about saving, are more risk averse, have a weaker internal locus of control, consider 
themselves more trusting, and have stronger bequest motives. Again, it is important to note that the 
magnitude  of  the  effect  can  differ  between  the  considered  religions.  In  addition,  Protestants  and 
Evangelicals have a greater sense of individual financial responsibility than non-religious or Catholic 
households (Panel D), while Catholics and Protestants have a relatively long time horizon (Panel G). 
In general, the results of the F-tests indicate that the religion variables are strongly correlated with 
economic attitudes. In the instrumentation of THRIFT (Panel A) and LOW RESPONSIBILITY (Panel 
D), the F-statistics are relatively low. Still, even in those cases, the F-value is around 4 in the set-up 
with  all  religion  dummy  variables,  and  the  p-value  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  that  there  is  no 
correlation  between  the  denomination  variables  and  the  economic  attitude.  We  now  turn  to  the 
discussion of the second stage results. Wherever possible, we will focus on the models in which the 
attitude is instrumented by all four religion dummies. 
Panel A shows that thrift is an important channel through which religion affects the savings decision. 
The high emphasis on thrift with Catholics, Protestants and (especially) Evangelicals leads to a higher 
probability of saving within these households. Moreover, the Wald test indicates that thrift is indeed 
endogenous with respect to the savings decision (p-value of 0.007), and the result on the ALN-test 
shows that our model which includes all religious denomination variables is not overidentified (p-WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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value  of  0.705).  Although  we  see  significant  results  for  the  models  in  which  RISKY  and 
RISKY/FINASSETS are the dependent variables, one should be careful in drawing conclusions as the 
ALN-test indicates that these models are overidentified, implying that the model is not consistent with 
the data.  
In addition to thrift, risk aversion (RISK AVERSION) plays a significant role in household finance, 
and is able to partially explain how religion affects financial decision-taking (see Panel B of Table 6). 
In  general,  religious  households  –  Catholics  and  Evangelicals  in  particular  –  have  a  higher  risk 
aversion, which in turn leads to a higher likelihood of saving. Moreover, the specification in which the 
four  religious  denomination  dummies  serve  as  instruments  for  the  endogenous  economic  attitude 
RISK AVERSION is not overidentified (p-value of 0.171), which validates the model. With respect to 
investing in risky assets, it seems that the higher risk aversion of Catholics and Protestants leads to 
lower investments. In contrast, the specifications in which risk aversion is instrumented by all four 
religious denomination variables is clearly overidentified when RISKY or RISKY/FINASSETS are 
the  dependent  variables  (p-values  on  the  ALN-test  of  0.000).  This  may  be  explained  by  the 
observation that, at least in our dataset, Evangelicals have the highest levels of risk aversion, but also 
invest more than on average in risky assets.  
Protestants and Evangelicals have a stronger external locus of control (lower values on INTERNAL 
LOCUS),  and  a  higher  sense  of  individual  financial  responsibility  (lower  values  on  LOW 
RESPONSIBILITY). There is some evidence that a stronger external locus of control leads to lower 
investments in risky assets for Catholic and Protestant households (Panel C). From Panel D, which 
concerns individual responsibility, no strong conclusions can be drawn as the second stage coefficients 
are generally not significant (while the first stage F-statistics were already low). 
Panel E shows that religious household heads of all denominations consider themselves relatively 
trusting,  and  more  trusting  people  (lower  values  on  DISTRUST)  are  more  likely  to  save.  The 
specifications trying to explain the decision to hold risky assets are clearly overidentified (the p-values 
on ALN-test are lower than 0.05) when more than one instrument is used, which sheds some doubt on 
the use of DISTRUST as a channel between religious background and risky investments.  
As  reported  before,  religious  beliefs  lead  to  stronger  bequest  motives  (Panel  F  of  Table  6). The 
bequest  motive  seems  to  be  an  important  channel  between  religion  and  savings  behavior  for  all 
denominations considered in this study. At least for Catholics and Protestants (but again especially for 
the  first  group),  a  stronger  bequest  motive  may  also  lead  to  lower  investments  in  risky  assets. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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Differences in the planning horizon can partially explain differences in household finance (see Panel 
G): the longer planning horizons of Catholics and Protestants lead to a higher likelihood of saving and 
a lower likelihood of investing in risky assets. It may seem somewhat counterintuitive (see Campbell 
and Viceira, 2002) that a long planning horizon leads to lower investments in risky financial assets. 
However,  it  may  be  that  religious  households  with  strong  bequest  motives  and,  relatedly,  long 
planning horizons do not want to “gamble” with the money foreseen for their children and therefore 
invest less in risky asset categories. 
Overall, we can conclude that several economic channels are relevant within the context of religion 
and household finance. The higher emphasis on thrift, higher risk aversion, higher (self-reported) trust, 
stronger  bequest  motive  and  longer  planning  horizons  can  all  partially  explain  why  religious 
households  of  all  denominations  are  more  likely  to  put  aside  more  money  than  non-religious 
households. The lower investments in risky assets by Catholics (and also somewhat by Protestants) are 
due  to  a  combination  of  higher  risk  aversion,  a  stronger  bequest  motive,  and  a  longer  planning 
horizon. It is, however, hard to explain why (the small sample of) Evangelicals in our study combine 
relatively large investments in risky assets with relatively ‘conservative’ economic attitudes (with 
exception of the shorter horizon).
20  
 
6. Robustness checks 
In the previous section, we have performed two multivariate regression analyses with the financial 
choices  as  dependent  variables.  In  Table  4,  the  religion  denominations  were  included  as  the 
independent variables, while in Table 5 we looked into the economic attitudes. In both cases, we 
introduced year fixed effects, and clustered the standard errors per household, as this leads to unbiased 
standard errors (Petersen, 2009). However, an alternative way of exploiting the panel structure of our 
data set is estimating a random effects model, which will also result in correctly sized confidence 
interval, as long as the household effect is permanent (Petersen, 2009). Therefore, as a robustness 
check, we repeat the analyses from Tables 4 and 5, but now with household random effects. Again, we 
                                                 
20 A possible explanation for this puzzle is given by Crowe (2009). He states that some Evangelical writers have 
stressed the importance “to behave wisely in all spheres of life (including the economic) even while expecting 
Jesus’ return”. To illustrate this, these writers have quoted the parable of the nobleman who entrusted his savings 
to  his  servants,  and  upon  his  return  praised  the  servant  that  had  invested  the  money  lucratively,  while 
condemning the one that had only safely locked away the money. WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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include all control variables and year dummies. We find that the results and conclusions are very 
similar to the ones from the previous section.
21 
In our instrumental variable analysis, we estimated equations (3) and (4) via a two-step procedure. An 
alternative to this approach is a joint maximum likelihood estimation of the system of equations. An 
advantage of this methodology is that standard errors can be clustered by household. We thus repeat 
all analyses from Table 6 using maximum likelihood. Again, our conclusions remain unchanged.  
 
7. Conclusion 
"No servant can serve two masters;  
for either he will hate the one and love the other,  
or else he will be devoted to one and despise the other.  
You cannot serve God and wealth." 
[Luke 16:13] 
Although recent studies have made clear that religion can be an important force on the macro level, 
less is known about the role religion plays on the micro level of the individual or the household. 
Therefore, this study has looked into the impact of religion on household finance: do households 
belonging to specific  religious  denominations take  different  financial  decisions  than  non-religious 
households? And  also:  which  economic attitudes  act  as  channels between religion  and household 
financial decision-making? 
In his review of the literature, Campbell (2006) lists a number of characteristics of the ideal data set 
for  positive  household  finance  research:  amongst  others,  the  sample  of  households  should  be 
representative of the total population, the data set should measure both total wealth and its breakdown 
into relevant categories and asset classes, the data should be reported with a high level of accuracy, 
and the data set should be of the panel data type. Luckily, such a data set exists for the Netherlands: 
the DNB Household Survey, formerly known as the CentER Savings Survey. This is also the data set 
used by Guiso et al. (2008) to measure the impact of trust on stock market participation. 
We use data from the DNB Household Survey from 1995 to 2008. We relate religious affiliation both 
to economic attitudes and to financial decision variables. We conclude that Catholics, Protestants, and 
Evangelicals deem it important to save, are relatively risk-averse, are less likely to think that their life 
                                                 
21 We do not present the tables of the robustness checks, but the results are available upon request.  WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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is  determined  by  their  own  actions  (they  have  a  stronger  external  locus  of  control),  consider 
themselves more trusting, and care more about leaving money to their children than non-religious 
households.  Additionally,  Catholics  and  Protestants  (but  not  Evangelicals)  have  longer  planning 
horizons,  and  Protestants  and  Evangelicals  (but  not  Catholics)  have  a  relatively  great  sense  of 
individual financial responsibility.  
Next, we show that religious household heads are more likely to put aside money than non-religious 
individuals,  controlling  for  demographic  characteristics  (such  as  age,  gender,  family  size,  and 
education) and background risk factors (such as the health status). Catholic households are less likely 
to invest in risky assets such as bonds and stocks, whereas Evangelical households are significantly 
more likely to hold risky assets.  
We  also  use  a  two-staged  instrumental  variables  approach  to  examine  through  which  economic 
preferences religion influences households’ financial behaviour. In other words, we attempt to answer 
why  religious  convictions  lead  to  specific  financial  decisions.  In  a  first  stage,  we  investigate  the 
relation between the religious denominations and the economic preferences (thrift, risk aversion, the 
locus  of  control  and  the  sense  of  financial  responsibility,  trust,  the  bequest  motive  and  planning 
horizon). In the second stage, we study the impact of the economic attitudes (instrumented by religious 
convictions).  We  conclude  that  the  differences  in  financial  decisions  between  the  religious 
denominations can indeed to a certain extent be explained by variations in the economic attitudes. 
Thrift is an important channel through which religion affects the savings decision: the high emphasis 
on thrift with Catholics, Protestants and (especially) Evangelicals leads to a higher probability of 
saving within these households. Saving is also stimulated by the higher risk aversion and stronger 
bequest motives that we find in religious households, and by the longer planning horizons of Catholics 
and Protestants. 
With respect to investing in risky assets, the higher risk aversion of Catholics (and Protestants, but to a 
lesser degree) leads to lower investments. Again, the differences in the bequest motive and planning 
horizon can partially explain differences in household finance: the greater importance that Catholics 
attach to leaving a bequest to their children and the longer horizons of Catholics and Protestants lead 
to lower likelihoods of investing in risky assets. It may be that religious households with strong 
bequest motives and, relatedly, long planning horizons do not want to “gamble” with the money 
foreseen for their children and therefore invest less in risky asset categories.  WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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Our results have both micro- and macroeconomic implications. First, they show that heterogeneity in 
religious beliefs may lead to variation in economic attitudes and financial decision-making on the 
level of the individual or the household. Second, they also suggest how cross-country variation in 
savings  decisions  and  financial  participation  may  be  influenced  by  differences  in  religion  and 
religiosity. For example, it is interesting to observe that the European countries which traditionally 
have  the  lowest  stock  market  participation  rates  (such  as  Austria,  Italy,  and  Spain)  are  all 
predominantly Catholic. Our results suggest that religion may play an important role here, through its 
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
Table 1 defines our variables. The second column shows the source in the DNB Household Survey. The third column shows how the 
information translates to the values used in this study. 
 
Question / statement / information used Values
Financial decisions
SAVED "Did your household put any money aside in the past 12 
months?"
"yes"=1; "no"=0
RISKY Sum of household investments in stocks, bonds, put and call 
options and funds
larger than zero=1; zero=0
STOCKS Sum of household investments in stocks larger than zero=1; zero=0
RISKY/FINASSETS Ratio of RISKY to total financial assets [0,1]




RELIGIOUS Religion no religious denomination=0; other=1
CATHOLIC Religion Roman-Catholic=1; other=0
PROTESTANT Religion mainline Protestant=1; other=0
EVANGELICAL Religion Evangelical=1; other=0
OTHER RELIGION Religion {Muslim, Humanist, other}=1; other=0
Economic attitudes
THRIFT "Being careful with money is an important character trait" "totally disagree"=1;...;"totally agree"=7
RISK AVERSION “I think it is more important to have safe investments and 
guaranteed returns, than to take a risk to have a chance to get 
the highest possible returns”
"totally disagree"=1;...;"totally agree"=7
INTERNAL LOCUS “My life is determined by my own actions.” "totally disagree"=1;...;"totally agree"=7
LOW RESPONSIBILITY “It is chiefly a matter of fate whether I become rich or poor.” "totally disagree"=1;...;"totally agree"=7
DISTRUST "Please indicate for each pair of qualities which number would 
best desribe your personality."
"trusting, credulous"=1;...;"suspicous"=7
BEQUEST MOTIVE "How important is it to you to have some money saved […] so I 
can leave a house and/or other valuable assets to my 
children?”
"very unimportant"=1;...;"important"=7
TIME HORIZON "Which of the time-horizons mentioned below is in your 
household most important with regard to planning 
expenditures and savings?"
"the next couple of months"=1; "the next 
year"=2; "the next couple of years"=3; "the 
next 5 to 10 years"=4; "more than 10 years 
from now"=5
Control variables
AGE Year of survey - year of birth
MALE Sex of the respondent male=1; female=0
PARTNER "Is there a partner present in the household?" "yes"=1; "no"=0
CHILDREN Number of children in the household
BAD HEALTH "In general, would you say your health is…" {"fair", "not so good", "poor"}=1; {"excellent", 
"good"}=0
EMPLOYED Primary occupation of the respondent "employed on a contractual basis"=1; 
other=0
SELF-EMPLOYED Primary occupation of the respondent {"works in own business", "free profession, 
freelance"}=1; other=0
RETIRED Primary occupation of the respondent "retired"=1; other=0
UNIVERSITY Highest level of education completed "university education"=1; other=0
VOCATIONAL Highest level of education completed "vocational colleges"=1; other=0
PRE-UNIVERSITY Highest level of education completed "HAVO, VWO (pre-university education)"=1; 
other=0
EDU_ACQUAINTANCES "Which level of education do most of your acquaintances 
have?"
{"vocational colleges / first year university 
education", "university education"}=1; 
other=0
LN(INCOME) Ln(total household net income in year 2007 euro)
LN(NET WORTH) Ln(total household net worth in year 2007 euro)WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics (number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (S.D), minimum, 
median, and maximum) for the variables used in this study. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
N Mean S.D. Min. Median Max. 
Financial decisions
SAVED 18,660 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00
RISKY 21,629 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
STOCKS 21,629 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00
RISKY/FINASSETS 20,391 0.11 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00
RISKY/FINASSETS* 5,636 0.40 0.30 0.00 0.33 1.00
Religion
RELIGIOUS 27,381 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
CATHOLIC 27,381 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
PROTESTANT 27,381 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00
EVANGELICAL 27,381 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00
OTHER RELIGION 27,381 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00
Economic attitudes
THRIFT 5,238 5.86 1.04 1.00 6.00 7.00
RISK AVERSION 16,408 5.02 1.69 1.00 5.00 7.00
INTERNAL LOCUS 3,848 4.99 1.26 1.00 5.00 7.00
LOW RESPONSIBILITY 3,847 3.23 1.52 1.00 3.00 7.00
DISTRUST 8,655 4.13 1.24 1.00 4.00 7.00
BEQUEST MOTIVE 18,394 2.72 1.78 1.00 2.00 7.00
TIME HORIZON 18,598 2.23 1.18 1.00 2.00 5.00
Control variables
AGE 27,924 48.75 14.47 14.00 47.00 95.00
MALE 27,926 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00 1.00
PARTNER 27,927 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00
CHILDREN 27,927 0.78 1.11 0.00 0.00 7.00
BAD HEALTH 20,404 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00
EMPLOYED 27,854 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
SELF-EMPLOYED 27,854 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00
RETIRED 27,854 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00
UNIVERSITY 27,925 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00
VOCATIONAL 27,925 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
PRE-UNIVERSITY 27,925 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00
EDU_ACQUAINTANCES 18,314 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
LN(INCOME) 18,600 10.12 0.85 -0.61 10.24 14.21
LN(NET WORTH) 17,418 11.12 1.75 -0.71 11.61 17.73
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Table 3: Univariate analysis economic attitudes and financial decisions 
Table 3 compares the mean values on the economic attitude variables (panel A) and financial decision variables (panel B) of the non-religious group with the group of 
religious households, and with the subgroups of Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical and other religious household heads. It also reports the results of an independent 
samples T-test. T-statistics which are significantly different from zero on the 10% level are in bold. The number of observations (N) is indicated below each group. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis economic attitudes
Non-religious Religious T-stat Catholic T-stat Protestant T-stat Evangelical T-stat Other religion T-stat
THRIFT 5.78 5.95 -3.689 5.94 -3.012 6.01 -4.018 6.13 -2.266 5.78 -0.008
N 849 1,155 584 375 31 165
RISK AVERSION 4.89 4.95 -1.206 4.97 -1.430 4.92 -0.371 5.06 -0.794 4.94 -0.389
N 2,136 2,888 1,482 1,053 64 289
INTERNAL LOCUS 5.18 4.89 4.569 5.07 1.465 4.69 5.868 4.27 2.575 4.82 2.680
N 714 994 510 319 26 139
LOW RESPONSIBILITY 3.23 3.19 0.500 3.23 0.108 3.17 0.600 2.96 0.883 3.14 0.609
N 714 994 510 319 26 139
DISTRUST 4.27 4.02 6.504 4.04 5.160 4.05 4.512 4.04 1.412 3.81 5.286
N 1,791 2,397 1,265 868 53 211
BEQUEST MOTIVE 2.52 2.95 -8.854 3.07 -9.200 2.85 -5.215 3.01 -2.305 2.73 -1.970
N 2,337 3,111 1,598 1,126 68 319
TIME HORIZON 2.17 2.29 -3.711 2.34 -4.279 2.27 -2.306 2.01 1.291 2.19 -0.299
N 2,347 3,136 1,610 1,134 70 322
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Table 3 (cont.): Univariate analysis economic attitudes and financial decisions 
 
Panel B: Univariate analysis financial decisions
Non-religious Religious T-stat Catholic T-stat Protestant T-stat Evangelical T-stat Other religion T-stat
SAVED 0.69 0.72 -1.752 0.71 -1.366 0.73 -2.369 0.69 0.138 0.67 0.788
N 2,352 3,140 1,613 1,134 70 323
RISKY 0.2404 0.2438 -0.313 0.2441 -0.286 0.2437 -0.227 0.2381 0.048 0.2443 -0.160
N 2,592 3,523 1,823 1,268 84 348
STOCKS 0.1076 0.1169 -1.142 0.1114 -0.390 0.1222 -1.323 0.1548 -1.173 0.1178 -0.572
N 2,592 3,523 1,823 1,268 84 348
RISKY/FINASSETS 0.0937 0.0996 -0.960 0.0966 -0.408 0.1021 -1.036 0.1045 -0.417 0.1044 -0.790
N 2,482 3,395 1,754 1,231 81 329
RISKY/FINASSETS* 0.3795 0.3818 -0.165 0.3678 0.711 0.3931 -0.717 0.4596 -1.288 0.3971 -0.540
N 773 1,124 584 410 26 104WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TRADE: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
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Table 4: Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (with religion variables) 
Table 4 shows the results of a reduced-form regression analysis, with the financial decision variables as dependent variables, and the religion and control variables as independent 
variables. The coefficients on the year dummies are not reported. Standard errors are clustered per household. Coefficients on the religion and control variables which are significantly 
different from zero within the 10% level are reported in bold. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RELIGIOUS 0.090 0.043 -0.060 0.049 -0.045 0.061 -0.026 0.023 -0.006 0.017
CATHOLIC 0.092 0.050 -0.096 0.059 -0.133 0.072 -0.047 0.027 -0.015 0.020
PROTESTANT 0.095 0.056 -0.078 0.063 0.019 0.076 -0.032 0.028 0.001 0.020
EVANGELICAL 0.281 0.185 0.598 0.235 0.872 0.243 0.258 0.091 0.019 0.051
OTHER RELIGION 0.017 0.100 0.084 0.117 -0.041 0.127 0.052 0.055 0.011 0.031
AGE -0.010 0.011 -0.010 0.010 -0.032 0.012 -0.033 0.012 -0.028 0.014 -0.028 0.014 -0.023 0.006 -0.023 0.006 -0.014 0.004 -0.014 0.004
AGE^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MALE -0.062 0.063 -0.064 0.063 0.074 0.070 0.081 0.070 0.196 0.091 0.203 0.090 0.040 0.034 0.044 0.034 0.006 0.024 0.007 0.024
PARTNER 0.074 0.059 0.074 0.059 -0.133 0.066 -0.132 0.066 -0.196 0.083 -0.203 0.083 -0.097 0.032 -0.096 0.031 -0.081 0.022 -0.081 0.022
CHILDREN -0.132 0.020 -0.132 0.020 -0.033 0.024 -0.038 0.024 0.021 0.030 0.015 0.029 -0.008 0.011 -0.011 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.011 0.008
BAD HEALTH -0.084 0.046 -0.082 0.046 -0.039 0.054 -0.044 0.054 -0.012 0.066 -0.009 0.066 -0.021 0.025 -0.024 0.025 -0.005 0.018 -0.006 0.018
EMPLOYED 0.411 0.065 0.410 0.065 -0.039 0.083 -0.044 0.083 -0.140 0.105 -0.150 0.104 -0.027 0.039 -0.029 0.039 -0.025 0.029 -0.024 0.029
SELF-EMPLOYED -0.118 0.106 -0.118 0.106 -0.211 0.124 -0.217 0.124 -0.150 0.143 -0.156 0.143 -0.078 0.059 -0.082 0.058 -0.002 0.045 -0.004 0.045
RETIRED 0.173 0.071 0.172 0.071 0.020 0.083 0.025 0.083 -0.061 0.097 -0.055 0.097 0.002 0.039 0.006 0.039 -0.002 0.030 0.000 0.030
UNIVERSITY 0.055 0.067 0.054 0.067 0.198 0.077 0.194 0.077 0.146 0.095 0.143 0.095 0.101 0.034 0.100 0.034 0.030 0.024 0.031 0.024
VOCATIONAL 0.070 0.053 0.071 0.053 0.118 0.062 0.112 0.062 0.120 0.077 0.119 0.077 0.051 0.028 0.048 0.028 -0.006 0.019 -0.005 0.019
PRE-UNIVERSITY -0.112 0.066 -0.111 0.066 0.256 0.080 0.259 0.080 0.280 0.096 0.289 0.096 0.126 0.037 0.128 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028
EDU_ACQUAINTANCES -0.035 0.045 -0.031 0.045 0.131 0.051 0.133 0.051 0.104 0.064 0.113 0.064 0.049 0.023 0.050 0.023 -0.009 0.015 -0.009 0.015
LN(INCOME) -0.449 0.167 -0.448 0.166 -0.231 0.121 -0.223 0.120 -0.377 0.117 -0.378 0.116 -0.105 0.058 -0.099 0.058 -0.200 0.097 -0.196 0.098
LN(INCOME)^2 0.032 0.009 0.032 0.009 0.021 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.028 0.007 0.028 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005
LN(NET WORTH) 0.474 0.092 0.477 0.093 -0.162 0.109 -0.152 0.112 -0.389 0.113 -0.373 0.117 -0.052 0.054 -0.048 0.055 -0.369 0.073 -0.368 0.073
LN(NET WORTH)^2 -0.019 0.005 -0.019 0.005 0.023 0.005 0.023 0.006 0.034 0.006 0.034 0.006 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.017 0.003
Constant -0.658 0.947 -0.677 0.941 -0.988 0.827 -1.100 0.836 0.204 0.835 0.077 0.847 -0.345 0.404 -0.395 0.406 3.669 0.627 3.639 0.633





Probit Probit Probit Tobit OLS
SAVED RISKY STOCKS RISKY/FINASSETS
0.1116 0.1123 0.1430 0.1497 0.1447 0.1475 0.0716 0.0720 0.1403 0.1430
11,231 11,231 11,571 11,571 11,571 11,571 11,439 11,439 3,857 3,857
-5,942.6 -5,940.5 -6,331.9 -6,311.9 -4,309.4 -4,275.5 -6,327.8 -6,306.9
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Table 5: Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (with economic attitudes)  
Table 5 shows the results of a regression analysis, with the financial decision variables as dependent variables (SAVED in Panel A, 
RISKY in Panel B, and RISKY/FINASSETS in Panel C), and the economic attitudes and control variables as independent variables. The 
coefficients  on  the  control  variables  (AGE,  AGE^2,  MALE,  PARTNER,  CHILDREN,  BAD  HEALTH,  EMPLOYED,  SELF-EMPLOYED, 
RETIRED,  UNIVERSITY,  VOCATIONAL,  PRE-UNIVERSITY,  EDU_ACQUAINTANCES,  LN(INCOME),  LN(INCOME)^2,  LN(NET 
WORTH), LN(NET WORTH)^2), the year dummies, and the constant are not reported. Standard errors are clustered per household. 
Coefficients which are significantly different from zero on the 10% level are in bold. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Multivariate analysis SAVED (with economic attitudes)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
THRIFT 0.060 0.029
RISK AVERSION 0.050 0.011
INTERNAL LOCUS 0.016 0.025
LOW RESPONSIBILITY -0.057 0.022
DISTRUST 0.017 0.019
BEQUEST MOTIVE -0.001 0.011
TIME HORIZON 0.148 0.015
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes




Panel B: Multivariate analysis RISKY (with economic attitudes)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
THRIFT 0.076 0.033
RISK AVERSION -0.090 0.012
INTERNAL LOCUS 0.046 0.028
LOW RESPONSIBILITY -0.057 0.023
DISTRUST 0.050 0.021
BEQUEST MOTIVE 0.026 0.012
TIME HORIZON 0.087 0.015
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes














11,207 11,299 3,216 10,419 2,429 5,055
-1,779.3 -5,400.8 -1,352.5 -2,569.8
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Table 5 (cont.): Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (with economic attitudes)  
 
Panel C: Multivariate analysis RISKY/FINASSETS (with economic attitudes)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
THRIFT 0.023 0.014
RISK AVERSION -0.049 0.005
INTERNAL LOCUS 0.023 0.013
LOW RESPONSIBILITY -0.026 0.010
DISTRUST 0.015 0.010
BEQUEST MOTIVE 0.012 0.006
TIME HORIZON 0.033 0.007
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N
Log (pseudo)likel.
(Pseudo) R2 0.1464 0.1491 0.1320 0.1500 0.1445 0.1635
-1,418.2 -2,845.0
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Table 6: Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (IV approach)  
Table 6 shows the results of a two-step IV regression analysis, with the financial decision variables as dependent variables. In each case, the economic attitude (THRIFT in Panel A, 
RISK AVERSION in Panel B, INTERNAL LOCUS in Panel C, LOW RESPONSIBILITY in Panel D, DISTRUST in Panel E, BEQUEST MOTIVE in Panel F, and TIME HORIZON in Panel 
G) is first instrumented by RELIGION, and then by all four denomination variables. In a third column, the economic attitude is instrumented by CATHOLIC and PROTESTANT, but here 
Evangelicals and “other” religious denominations are excluded from the data set. The results on a Wald test of exogeneity, the Amemiya-Lee-Newey (ALN) overidentification test, and the 
F-test on the excluded instruments in the first stage are reported at the bottom of each panel. The coefficients on the control variables (AGE, AGE^2, MALE, PARTNER, CHILDREN, 
BAD  HEALTH,  EMPLOYED,  SELF-EMPLOYED,  RETIRED,  UNIVERSITY,  VOCATIONAL,  PRE-UNIVERSITY,  EDU_ACQUAINTANCES,  LN(INCOME),  LN(INCOME)^2,  LN(NET 
WORTH), LN(NET WORTH)^2), the year dummies, and the constant are not reported. Coefficients which are significantly different from zero within the 10% level are reported in bold.  
 
 
Panel A: Multivariate analysis financial decisions with THRIFT instrumented
Second stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
THRIFT 1.132 0.944 1.027 0.437 0.825 0.760 0.222 0.745 0.718 0.379 -0.281 0.690 0.128 0.339 0.283 0.160 -0.171 0.313
First stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RELIGIOUS 0.068 0.037 0.068 0.037 0.066 0.037
CATHOLIC 0.074 0.042 0.076 0.043 0.074 0.042 0.076 0.043 0.071 0.043 0.073 0.043
PROTESTANT 0.080 0.049 0.082 0.049 0.080 0.049 0.082 0.049 0.081 0.049 0.083 0.049
EVANGELICAL 0.469 0.150 0.469 0.150 0.469 0.150
OTHER RELIGION -0.088 0.075 -0.088 0.075 -0.090 0.075
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N
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 Table 6 (cont.): Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (IV approach)  
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis financial decisions with RISK AVERSION instrumented
Second stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RISK AVERSION 0.618 0.249 0.367 0.150 0.393 0.179 -0.479 0.221 -0.203 0.137 -0.481 0.177 -0.192 0.093 -0.103 0.058 -0.215 0.076
First stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RELIGIOUS 0.139 0.033 0.140 0.033 0.142 0.034
CATHOLIC 0.205 0.039 0.203 0.039 0.205 0.039 0.204 0.039 0.210 0.039 0.207 0.039
PROTESTANT 0.086 0.043 0.085 0.043 0.086 0.043 0.086 0.043 0.087 0.043 0.087 0.043
EVANGELICAL 0.375 0.149 0.375 0.149 0.388 0.150
OTHER RELIGION -0.094 0.077 -0.094 0.077 -0.102 0.078
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N
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Table 6 (cont.): Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (IV approach)  
 
Panel C: Multivariate analysis financial decisions with INTERNAL LOCUS instrumented
Second stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
INTERNAL LOCUS -0.363 0.294 -0.221 0.168 -0.172 0.171 -0.008 0.277 0.152 0.163 0.336 0.173 -0.051 0.122 0.067 0.071 0.161 0.076
First stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RELIGIOUS -0.209 0.052 -0.205 0.050 -0.206 0.050
CATHOLIC -0.043 0.060 -0.046 0.059 -0.041 0.058 -0.045 0.057 -0.043 0.059 -0.047 0.058
PROTESTANT -0.433 0.069 -0.444 0.068 -0.426 0.067 -0.438 0.066 -0.427 0.067 -0.438 0.066
EVANGELICAL -0.343 0.208 -0.436 0.202 -0.434 0.202
OTHER RELIGION -0.290 0.105 -0.263 0.101 -0.262 0.101
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N





P-value F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.009 0.321





14.582 0.344 11.648 0.284
3.07 0.49 0.37
0.080 0.486
2.45 0.48 0.04 1.34









16.65 12.26 23.79 16.72 12.17 23.65
SAVED RISKY RISKY/FINASSETS
Probit (in 2nd stage) Probit (in 2nd stage) Tobit (in 2nd stage)
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Table 6 (cont.): Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (IV approach)  
 
Panel D: Multivariate analysis financial decisions with LOW RESPONSIBILITY instrumented
Second stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
LOW RESPONSIB. -0.815 0.805 -0.407 0.256 -0.295 0.371 -0.029 0.637 -0.216 0.227 0.755 0.485 -0.126 0.297 -0.096 0.095 0.359 0.211
First stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RELIGIOUS -0.092 0.061 -0.089 0.059 -0.086 0.059
CATHOLIC 0.024 0.071 0.026 0.071 0.026 0.069 0.028 0.069 0.033 0.069 0.036 0.069
PROTESTANT -0.191 0.082 -0.186 0.082 -0.180 0.079 -0.176 0.080 -0.184 0.079 -0.179 0.080
EVANGELICAL -0.692 0.245 -0.736 0.237 -0.736 0.237
OTHER RELIGION -0.195 0.123 -0.200 0.119 -0.197 0.119
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N





P-value F-test 0.026 0.130 0.003 0.031 0.131 0.001 0.034 0.144 0.001
4.66 2.13 3.39 2.30 4.53 2.29 3.48 4.10









2.19 1.44 4.85 0.45 0.00 0.42
2,429 2,563 2,362 2,571 2,571 2,232 2,429 2,354 2,563




Tobit (in 2nd stage)
3.66
0.731 0.230
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Table 6 (cont.): Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (IV approach)  
 
Panel E: Multivariate analysis financial decisions with DISTRUST instrumented
Second stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
DISTRUST -0.365 0.157 -0.305 0.150 -0.401 0.161 0.259 0.146 0.184 0.141 0.340 0.152 0.144 0.068 0.103 0.065 0.178 0.071
First stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RELIGIOUS -0.282 0.035 -0.283 0.035 -0.285 0.035
CATHOLIC -0.251 0.041 -0.253 0.041 -0.257 0.040 -0.259 0.040 -0.261 0.041 -0.263 0.041
PROTESTANT -0.312 0.045 -0.313 0.045 -0.306 0.044 -0.307 0.044 -0.304 0.045 -0.304 0.045
EVANGELICAL -0.134 0.177 -0.135 0.177 -0.149 0.179
OTHER RELIGION -0.383 0.090 -0.389 0.088 -0.385 0.089
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N





P-value F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4,984 4,984 4,742
Probit (in 2nd stage)
5,044 4,795 5,114 5,114 4,860 5,044
5.9 5.18 7.76 2.13 0.98
0.005
3.88 3.86 2.03
0.154 0.015 0.145 0.323 0.049 0.050
8.323 3.728 0.117 27.316
0.733 0.000 0.039 0.000








Probit (in 2nd stage) Tobit (in 2nd stage)
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Table 6 (cont.): Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (IV approach)  
 
Panel F: Multivariate analysis financial decisions with BEQUEST MOTIVE instrumented
Second stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
BEQUEST MOTIVE 0.282 0.090 0.231 0.073 0.220 0.080 -0.187 0.087 -0.026 0.069 -0.231 0.080 -0.082 0.040 -0.012 0.031 -0.113 0.037
First stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RELIGIOUS 0.324 0.032 0.324 0.032 0.321 0.032
CATHOLIC 0.416 0.037 0.416 0.037 0.416 0.037 0.416 0.037 0.414 0.037 0.414 0.037
PROTESTANT 0.172 0.041 0.170 0.041 0.172 0.041 0.170 0.041 0.167 0.042 0.166 0.041
EVANGELICAL 0.887 0.144 0.887 0.144 0.912 0.145
OTHER RELIGION 0.282 0.074 0.282 0.074 0.269 0.075
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N





P-value F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000
10,446 11,126 11,126 11,126 10,446 11,004 11,004
10.96 10.83
11,126
8.46 6.43 0.67 10.84 5.98 0.83 12.56
10,335
0.011 0.412 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.014 0.362 0.000










62.99 102.31 37.93 62.99 37.55 61.60
RISKY RISKY/FINASSETS
Probit (in 2nd stage) Tobit (in 2nd stage)
0.000 0.424
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Table 6 (cont.): Multivariate analysis of the financial decisions (IV approach) 
 
Panel G: Multivariate analysis financial decisions with TIME HORIZON instrumented
Second stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
TIME HORIZON 1.215 0.484 0.667 0.320 1.047 0.402 -0.839 0.455 -1.525 0.484 -1.070 0.444 -0.369 0.203 -0.699 0.219 -0.514 0.207
First stage Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
RELIGIOUS 0.075 0.022 0.075 0.022 0.076 0.022
CATHOLIC 0.097 0.026 0.097 0.026 0.097 0.026 0.096 0.026 0.095 0.026 0.095 0.026
PROTESTANT 0.066 0.029 0.065 0.029 0.066 0.029 0.065 0.029 0.069 0.029 0.068 0.029
EVANGELICAL -0.121 0.101 -0.121 0.101 -0.135 0.101
OTHER RELIGION 0.030 0.051 0.030 0.051 0.035 0.052
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N









0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
0.854 0.183 0.879
11.43 4.42 7.27 11.40 4.40 7.25 11.43
0.040 0.454 0.178
8.320 0.560 4.914 0.034
0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.004 0.090 0.006 0.011
30.71 12.87 6.01 31.77 13.92 8.39 2.88 7.44 6.53
10,413 11,217 10,528 11,090 11,090 11,216 11,216 10,527 11,217
SAVED RISKY RISKY/FINASSETS
Probit (in 2nd stage) Probit (in 2nd stage) Tobit (in 2nd stage)
 